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Bulletins and News Discussion from December 9th to December 15th, 2024 - Assad Must Go

Image is of Assad and his family.


After less than two weeks of retreating with few shots fired and little resistance, the SAA has retreated into, well, a state of non-existence. This thereby ends a conflict that has been simmering for over a decade. With the end of this conflict, another begins: the carving up of what used to be Syria between Israel and Turkey, with perhaps the odd Syrian faction getting a rump state here and there. Both Israel and Turkey have begun military operations, with Israel working on expanding their territory in Syria and bombing military bases to ensure as little resistance as possible.

Israeli success in Syria is interesting to contrast against their failures in Gaza and Lebanon. A short time ago, Israel failed to make significant territorial progress in Lebanon due to Hezbollah's resistance despite the heavy hits they had recently taken, and was forced into a ceasefire with little to show for the manpower and equipment lost and the settlers displaced. The war with Lebanon was fast, but still slow enough to allow a degree of analysis and prediction. In contrast, the sheer speed of Syria's collapse has made analysis near-impossible beyond obvious statements like "this is bad" and "Assad is fucking up"; by the time a major Syrian city had fallen, you barely had time to digest the implications before the next one was under threat.

There is still too much that we don't know about the potential responses (and non-responses) of other countries in the region - Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Russia, for example. I think that this week and the next will see a lot of statements made by various parties and an elucidation of how the conflict will progress. The only thing that seems clear is that we are in the next stage of the conflict, and perhaps have been, in retrospect, since Nasrallah's assassination. This stage has been and will be far more chaotic as the damage to Israel compounds and they are willing to take greater and greater risks to stay in power. It will also involve Israel causing destruction all throughout the region, rather than mostly localizing it in Gaza and southern Lebanon. Successful gambles like with Syria may or may not outweigh the unsuccessful ones like with Lebanon. This is a similar road to the one apartheid South Africa took, but there are also too many differences to say if the destination will be the same.

What is certain is that Assad's time in power can be summarized as a failure, both to be an effective leader and to create positive economic conditions. His policies were actively harmful to internal stability for no real payoff and by the end, all goodwill had been fully depleted. By the end, the SAA did not fight back; not because of some wunderwaffen on the side of HST, but because there was nothing to fight for, and internal cohesion rapidly disintegrated.


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The bulletins site is here!
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Last week's thread is here.

Israel-Palestine Conflict

If you have evidence of Israeli crimes and atrocities that you wish to preserve, there is a thread here in which to do so.

Sources on the fighting in Palestine against Israel. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:

UNRWA reports on Israel's destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.

English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.

English-language PalestineResist telegram channel.
More telegram channels here for those interested.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Sources:

Defense Politics Asia's youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don't want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it's just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists' side.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.

Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:

Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR's former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR's forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster's telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a 'propaganda tax', if you don't believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.

Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:

Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.


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  • With regards to the Russian Oreshnik IRBM (and conventional prompt strike weapons in general), and Putin's statements over the past few days and weeks about how these conventional weapons can do similar amount of damage as tactical nuclear weapons, the user @bbnh69420@hexbear.net asked a really good question: what kind of facilities would take a similar amount of damage from an Oreshnik strike as a tactical nuclear weapon?

    My attempt to answer that question, with some analysis and satellite imagery. Click here to expand the spoiler tag.

    My answer was an airbase, for the following reasons: Airbases are quite spread out hardened targets, with everything you want to strike spread out over kilometres, and usually protected by hardened shelters, in the case of forward airbases that are likely to be hit first. You can either do this with a lot of high precision weapons, or with a wide area of effect weapons, such as using cluster warheads/submunitions, or even a tactical nuclear weapon in a total war scenario.

    The problem with a lot of submunition or cluster munition based weapons, is that the smaller conventional explosive munitions lack the power to seriously damage any hardened shelters, for aircraft, resources or personnel. That's fine if the airbase is relatively unprotected, but if it's full of hardened shelters, it poses a serious issue. But Oreshnik is unique in this regard: it is suspected to use kinetic submunitions that travel fast enough and with enough energy to penetrate these hardened shelters and cause damage to them. That's why I thought Oreshnik would be an ideal weapon to seriously damage forward airbases. It's a submunition weapon, without the drawbacks of typical submunition weapons.

    To support my argument, we'll be using imagery and data from Iran's retaliatory strike on Nevatim Airbase during Operation True Promise II. We know that there were 33 observed impacts on the base. So what if, instead of each impact being from a single warhead, it was from a grouping of submunitions with a 175m radius for the grouping. 175m is the estimated damage radius of a Chinese DF-15 SRBM with a submunition warhead, so it's why I'm using that figure (also I'm lazy and some OSINT guy on twitter already did the math and imagery with that radius). 33 groupings would be the approximately the equivalent of six Oreshnik IRBMs, as each Oreshnik is estimated to carry 6 MIRVs, with six submunitions each. Six Oreshniks would give you 36 groupings, so three more than the Iranian strike. But close enough for this comparison. Now Iran did not use submunitions for the reason I described in the previous paragraph, but we know that reasoning does not apply to Oreshnik, so here we go:

    As you can see, we go from singular impacts mostly missing key targets, to getting good coverage over key buildings on the base as a whole. Let's look at the potential hits in detail:

    As for the aircraft shelters in the north west of the base, the strike has gone from hitting none of them, to hitting 9 aircraft shelters within the radius of the cluster strike. And those 9 shelters only required two groupings to take out. Now let's move on to the F-35 hardened shelters at the heart of the base:

    Iran achieved one direct hit here with a couple of near misses. But now with a potential cluster munition strike, 19 of these hardened shelters are hit, along with a couple of other buildings. A huge difference. Now moving on to the aircraft hangars to the east:

    Here Iran did manage a some good hits on these hangars, so the difference is not large. But there is full coverage over the hangars, and six large aircraft could have been destroyed if they were unable to get in the air before the strike.

    So in conclusion, from the Iranian strike, to a potential Oreshnik strike with six Oreshniks on the same target, we've gone from a direct hit on 1 F-35 hardened aircraft shelter and a couple of hits on unprotected hangars to the east, to hitting 19 F-35 shelters, 9 other fighter jet shelters, 5 unprotected hangars (for 33 hangars/shelters total), and 6 large parked aircraft. And that's if Oreshnik has the same accuracy as Iranian MRBMs. If it has greater accuracy, the same damage could be done with less Oreshniks, or more damage with the same amount. If the Oreshnik was incredibly accurate and always hit it's mark (very unrealistic, but just for the sake of argument), only one Oreshnik would have been needed to take out those 33 hangars/hardened shelters, as only six groupings were required here. That's an incredible amount of damage from one conventional missile, to be able to take out 30+ fighter aircraft with one missile, while they are still on the ground. Even if multiple Oreshniks are required for such a strike (which is likely), it's still a massive amount of damage. This is what Putin means when he says it's equivalent to a tactical nuclear weapon. Taking out an entire airbase with half a dozen missiles, or even less if they are highly accurate.

    • There’s also the logistics issue.

      Here’s what a NATO operation would look like to take out an enemy airfield fully defended by air and ground assets:

      Everything has to be coordinated and timed, involving hundreds of air assets at once and possibly also ground/naval assets (e.g. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on land targets).

      First, you perform SEAD/DEAD (suppression/destruction of enemy air defense) missions to take out enemy radars and air defense complexes. Meanwhile, CAP (combat air patrol) and escort sorties with air superiority fighters to patrol the sectors and at least to keep enemy fighters from approaching the strike packages (e.g. F-35 bombers who will deliver the bombing payloads).

      At the same time, AWACS in the air to coordinate the operation and keep track of hundreds of air assets, checking and making sure everyone obeys ingress/egress routes. Electronic jammers like the Growlers to conduct offensive jamming on enemy sectors. Air tankers to perform refueling operations to extend the range of the bombers.

      Then, you hope that your strike packages (e.g. F-35s) could get through the enemy air defenses (if they are not completely eliminated) to deliver their payloads and destroy the designated targets, after which they will exit through the egress route (and jettison unused payloads along the way at designated sites) hoping that enemy fighters wouldn’t chase them down.

      All of logistics need to be taken into account and these can take extensive planning, coordination, training and even then the execution will almost always go wrong (e.g. friendly fires during Desert Storm, planes got shot down with malfunctioning transponders and took the wrong egress route, etc.).

      With the Oreshniks, all the Russians have to do is to pre-load the target information into the missile control systems, and then launch the rocket. That’s it, and it will arrive at its destination in minutes with 36 submunitions. You can even launch multiples of them at different targets, taking out multiple air bases (and other critical military assets) all at once within an hour, provided you have enough of them.

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