I've spent some time searching this question, but I have yet to find a satisfying answer. The majority of answers that I have seen state something along the lines of the following:
"It's just good security practice."
"You need it if you are running a server."
"You need it if you don't trust the other devices on the network."
"You need it if you are not behind a NAT."
"You need it if you don't trust the software running on your computer."
The only answer that makes any sense to me is #5. #1 leaves a lot to be desired, as it advocates for doing something without thinking about why you're doing it -- it is essentially a non-answer. #2 is strange -- why does it matter? If one is hosting a webserver on port 80, for example, they are going to poke a hole in their router's NAT at port 80 to open that server's port to the public. What difference does it make to then have another firewall that needs to be port forwarded? #3 is a strange one -- what sort of malicious behaviour could even be done to a device with no firewall? If you have no applications listening on any port, then there's nothing to access. #4 feels like an extension of #3 -- only, in this case, it is most likely a larger group that the device is exposed to. #5 is the only one that makes some sense; if you install a program that you do not trust (you don't know how it works), you don't want it to be able to readily communicate with the outside world unless you explicitly grant it permission to do so. Such an unknown program could be the door to get into your device, or a spy on your device's actions.
If anything, a firewall only seems to provide extra precautions against mistakes made by the user, rather than actively preventing bad actors from getting in. People seem to treat it as if it's acting like the front door to a house, but this analogy doesn't make much sense to me -- without a house (a service listening on a port), what good is a door?
For me, it's primarily #5: I want to know which apps are accessing the network and when, and have control over what I allow and what I don't. I've caught lots of daemons for software that I hadn't noticed was running and random telemetry activity that way, and it's helped me sort-of sandbox software that IMO does not need access to the network.
Not much to say about the other reasons, other than #2 makes more sense in the context of working with other people: If your policy is "this is meant to be an HTTPS-only machine," then you might want to enforce that at the firewall level to prevent some careless developer from serving the app on port 80 (HTTP), or exposing the database port while they're throwing spaghetti at the wall wrestling with some bug. That careless developer could be future-you, of course. Then once you have a policy you like, it's also easier to copy a firewall config around to multiple machines (which may be running different apps), instead of just making sure to get it consistently right on a server-by-server basis.
So... Necessary? Not for any reason I can think of. But useful, especially as systems and teams grow.
I’ve caught lots of daemons for software that I hadn’t noticed was running and random telemetry activity that way
I did the exact same thing recently when I installed OpenSnitch -- it was quite interesting to see all the requests that were being made.
If your policy is “this is meant to be an HTTPS-only machine,” then you might want to enforce that at the firewall level to prevent some careless developer from serving the app on port 80 (HTTP), or exposing the database port while they’re throwing spaghetti at the wall wrestling with some bug. That careless developer could be future-you, of course.