If the computer is powered off, moved or confiscated, there is no data to retrieve.
We get the operational benefits of having fewer breakable parts. Disks are among the components that break often. Therefore, switching away from them makes our infrastructure more reliable.
The operational tasks of setting up and upgrading package versions on servers become faster and easier.
While mostly true, there are ways to preserve ram if the device is confiscated.
Your local PD likely couldn’t pull it off, but if one of the larger abbreviation agencies were to get involved, data on RAM isn’t a huge hurdle. Assuming no one flips the power switch, at least.
Yeah, freezing and dumping RAM is a well known attack, even happening at some airports with laptops. But it still requires very recently powered ram, basically still in operation before extraction. It's a big step toward security at least.
I guess it's going to stop any standard agencies with a warrant. Confiscating the machine for it to sit in a warehouse until some forensic techs get their hands on it.
Sure, but how often does that happen to servers running 24/7? They'd have to set up some sort of dead man's switch, movement sensors, or something. It's unlikely they'd get a day's notice that the servers are going to be confiscated for forensic analysis.
How long do you think would you have? Also, any manual action on your part would be obstruction, while an automated system could be defended as anti-theft protection.
I'm not an expert but I think : The site you visit only sees the VPNs info. Which is how you maintain some anonymity while browsing. However, if your VPN keeps logs, then you can still be tracked, just at a different place. Some say they don't keep logs, and you'd have to trust that.
RAM is considered volatile memory, so each time the server turns off, it loses all data. This is compared to disk (hard drives of whatever type) which retain memory even if the server turns off.
In theory, this ram only server prevents them from keeping logs (like which user went where) since the server wouldn't even have a place to store it.
Edit: lustrums post is more accurate and has info that this doesn't prevent logging per se, but could prevent accidental logging. I.e. they can't hire a forensic computer specialist to parse through operating system logs to try to find info they didn't otherwise log elsewhere.
Yes, all the ISP will see is the vpn tunnel.
If you don't trust the ISP why are you with them?
When you access a website with https the ISP will not see what happens inside that connection as it too is encrypted.
If you run your own DNS server that uses root hints the ISP will see even less.
By using a vpn you're placing your trust on the provider and there is nothing stopping them filtering the outbound connection from all their VPN endpoints to collect and sell the meta data your hiding from you ISP.
All VPN providers just talk about logging but nothing about meta data collection, funny that 🤔
Some say they don’t keep logs, and you’d have to trust that.
Note that this same caveat applies for a VPN provider promising they are running diskless endpoints. Or that they don't have some third party monitoring their stuff even if diskless. Or that a law enforcement agency can't come along with a warrant to require them to monitor an account's activity moving forward, even if logs are not possible.
If your online activity justifies this level of paranoia, there's probably no meaningful protection available for your wants in practice. If your provider is operating in a jurisdiction that is problematic for your online activity, they can probably ultimately be compromised. If you are just using it to access a different country's streaming library, you probably don't need to be that paranoid. If you are trying to disguise illegal activity that is illegal in the jurisdiction of the VPN endpoint, well you are likely boned with logging or not.
A normal computer is usually constantly writing little bits and pieces of data to disk. But data on the disk might accidentally remain on the disk even if it's not intended. Then that data could be read later by someone else who is spying on VPN users .
There's also a common assumption that data on disk storage may leave behind remnants even after it's been overwritten. (Magnetic disks may leave behind some magnetic signatures. Flash drives will stop using sectors that are worn out, potentially leaving data there.) And state actors like NSA might have some capability to recover this ghost data if they get a hold of the actual drives.
There's a general understanding that data on RAM is irrevocably destroyed within a short time after the device loses power. So attacks on RAM data have to occur in real time while the data is in use. (There may be some attacks that preserve RAM after power down using low temperatures and liquid nitrogen).
It means that even though Mullvad already doesn’t log anything about their users activities, there is no persistent storage on the servers, so as soon as it is powered off or raided by The Agencies, there is absolutely nothing to retrieve from it.
If the computer is unplugged, there's nothing left on a hard drive to show what state it was in. This means nobody malicious can physically remove their servers and gain information about customers.