Florida's governor says he will "save our beef, but a lab-grown meat firm calls it an assault on liberty.
Florida Governor Ron DeSantis has banned lab-grown meat, saying he will "save our beef" from the "global elite" and its "authoritarian plans".
"Florida is fighting back against the global elite's plan to force the world to eat meat grown in a petri dish or bugs," Mr DeSantis said in a statement.
The first-in-the-nation law prohibits anyone from selling or distributing lab-grown meat in Florida.
Similar efforts are under way in Alabama, Arizona and Tennessee.
Lab-grown or "cultivated" meat was first cleared for consumption in the US in 2022.
Studies have suggested that eating cultivated meat can cut carbon emissions and water usage, and free up land for nature, compared to eating traditionally produced meat.
The Dormant Commerce Clause, or Negative Commerce Clause, in American constitutional law, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause in Article I of the US Constitution.[1] The primary focus of the doctrine is barring state protectionism. The Dormant Commerce Clause is used to prohibit state legislation that discriminates against, or unduly burdens, interstate or international commerce. Courts first determine whether a state regulation discriminates on its face against interstate commerce or whether it has the purpose or effect of discriminating against interstate commerce. If the statute is discriminatory, the state has the burden to justify both the local benefits flowing from the statute and to show the state has no other means of advancing the legitimate local purpose.
Thus, in a dormant Commerce Clause case, a court is initially concerned with whether the law facially discriminates against out-of-state actors or has the effect of favoring in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests. Discriminatory laws motivated by "simple economic protectionism" are subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity",[11] which can only be overcome by a showing that the State has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.[12]
On the other hand, when a law is "directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental", that is, where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach, the general contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.[13] If the law is not outright or intentionally discriminatory or protectionist, but still has some impact on interstate commerce, the court will evaluate the law using a balancing test. The Court determines whether the interstate burden imposed by a law outweighs the local benefits. If such is the case, the law is usually deemed unconstitutional.[14] In Pike, the Court explained that a state regulation having only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits".[15] When weighing burdens against benefits, a court should consider both "the nature of the local interest involved, and ... whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities".[citation needed] Thus regulation designed to implement public health and safety, or serve other legitimate state interests, but impact interstate commerce as an incident to that purpose, are subject to a test akin to the rational basis test, a minimum level of scrutiny.[16] In USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1281 (C.A.2 (N.Y.), 1995), the court explained:
If the state activity constitutes "regulation" of interstate commerce, then the court must proceed to a second inquiry: whether the activity regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce. As we use the term here, "discrimination" simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. The party challenging the validity of a state statute or municipal ordinance bears the burden of showing that it discriminates against, or places some burden on, interstate commerce. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1736, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979). If discrimination is established, the burden shifts to the state or local government to show that the local benefits of the statute outweigh its discriminatory effects, and that the state or municipality lacked a nondiscriminatory alternative that could have adequately protected the relevant local interests. If the challenging party cannot show that the statute is discriminatory, then it must demonstrate that the statute places a burden on interstate commerce that "is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."[17]